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Franchisees within large branded chains loudly complain of a form of channel conﬂict known as “encroach-ment” or “impact.” Encroachment occurs when franchisors add new units of their brand proximately
to their franchisees’ existing units. Franchisees claim that their revenues have substantially decreased as a
result of encroaching same-brand entry. The topic of encroachment has not only dominated franchisee associ-
ation agendas and trade journal headlines but has also become a hot topic for politicians and policymakers.
Yet, until now, evidence of encroachment has been strictly anecdotal. This paper provides the ﬁrst system-
atic evidence of encroachment. Using revenue data from the Texas lodging industry in the 1990s, I ﬁnd that
when franchisors approve new same-brand units in the vicinity of incumbent units, these new units can-
nibalize the incumbents’ revenues. In contrast to the result for franchisors, the addition of a new unit by
company-owned brands in the vicinity of same-brand units is associated with an increase in the incum-
bents’ revenues. This contrast suggests that encroaching behavior is caused by incentives that result from the
governance form of franchising and is not simply an outcome that accompanies all expansion. This ﬁnding
informs theory on governance forms and exclusive territories. Implications for practitioners and policy are also
discussed.
Key words : channels of distribution; franchising; encroachment; cannibalization; market entry
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The governance form of business format franchising
is common in the retail and service sectors, particu-
larly in the lodging and fast-food industries. In typical
business format franchising contracts, the franchisee
receives the right to use a franchisor’s brand name
and business plan in exchange for the payment of
an upfront fee and a sales royalty. Over the last sev-
eral decades, sales through business format franchised
chains have grown from a negligible value to about
3.5% of the United States GDP, or to about 25% of all
franchising in the nation (Lafontaine and Shaw 1999).
Franchisors of established brands have fueled much
of this growth by adding new units (sales locations)
in markets where units afﬁliated with their brands
already operate. As a result, franchisees of the existing
units complain of a form of channel conﬂict known
as “encroachment” or “impact.” Franchisors are said
to be encroaching on the incumbent franchisees’ units
by allowing other franchisees to operate new same-
brand units in their vicinity. The incumbent fran-
chisees claim that these new units cannibalize their
revenues.
Encroachment has been called the “most explo-
sive issue today in the franchising world” (Sheridan
and Gillespie 1995, p. 64) and has consistently dom-
inated agendas at franchisee conventions (Khanna
and Ganot 1995, p. 13). In 1995, the Cornell Hotel
and Restaurant Administration Quarterly even devoted
a special journal issue to encroachment. Despite
the extensive attention, the economic magnitude of
this important and controversial phenomenon has
not been systematically quantiﬁed. I begin to ﬁll
this gap—at least for one industry and geographic
region—by estimating the effect of new units on rev-
enues of proximate same-brand units within the ten
largest hotel chains in the state of Texas.
Encroachment has become even more worthy of
rigorous quantitative analysis because extensive lob-
bying efforts have convinced many policymakers
that franchisees should be legally protected from
encroachment. Legislative and judicial activity with
this aim has placed policymakers in the unusual
position of defending and even creating exclusive ter-
ritories for incumbent retailers, a practice often con-
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sidered anticompetitive (Coughlan et al. 2000, Dutta
et al. 1999, Blair and Lafontaine 2002). The strongest
antiencroachment policy currently in place is the Iowa
Franchise Act of 1992.1 The initial version of this act
protected franchisees from encroachment by designat-
ing a three-mile radius around their incumbent units
as an exclusive territory (Blair and Lafontaine 2002,
Footnote 7). At a national level, the Small Business
Franchise Act (HR 3308) was introduced in the U.S.
Congress in 1999. If passed, this bill would give fran-
chisees a right of ﬁrst refusal for the ownership of
any new units that might cannibalize their revenues.
Franchisees also received a short-lived victory in the
courts in 1991. The court ruled that, despite the lack
of any contractual territorial exclusivity, the franchisor
could be held liable if the franchisee lost revenues to
a new same-brand unit nearby (Scheck v. Burger King
Corp., 756 F. Supp. 543; S.D. Fla. 1991). This ruling
was overturned in 1996.
Not all multiunit ﬁrms in industries such as fast
food or hotels use franchising, however. Some ﬁrms
that possess brand names are “company owned,”
meaning that they are vertically integrated into the
ownership and operation of their individual units.
A company-owned multiunit ﬁrm, much like a fran-
chisor, may locate new units in such a way that canni-
balizes revenues of incumbents. If same-brand entry
decreases the revenues of proximate units within fran-
chised chains, I would only conclude that there was a
noteworthy encroachment effect if the same relation-
ship did not hold among the units of company-owned
ﬁrms.
I analyzed a large panel data set of quarterly rev-
enues between 1990 and 1999 of all hotels operating
in Texas afﬁliated with the state’s ten largest brands.
This data set allows a direct comparison of encroach-
ment effects within franchised chains and within
company-owned chains because both forms exist
among these ten chains. The La Quinta and Motel 6
brands are almost completely company-owned, while
the others are almost completely franchised. The eight
large franchised chains studied here are Best Western,
Comfort Inn, Days Inn, Econolodge, Hampton Inn,
Holiday Inn, Ramada, and Super 8. I estimated ﬁxed-
effects regressions with temporal and location-speciﬁc
intercepts to assess not only the effect of encroach-
ment (proximate same-brand entry) but also its oppo-
site (same-brand exit). If same-brand entry decreases
incumbents’ revenues, then same-brand exit is likely
to increase those revenues.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2, I describe
institutional regularities of franchising and the lodg-
1 Hawaii, Indiana, Minnesota, and Washington also have franchise
laws with antiencroachment provisions. These provisions are much
less extensive than those in the Iowa statute (Blair and Lafontaine
2002, Footnote 60)
ing industry. I also present theoretical arguments
that explain the basis of encroachment effects.
Section 3 describes the Texas hotel data in detail.
Section 4 describes the empirical methodology and
the measurement of all variables. Section 5 provides
a detailed description of empirical results and exten-
sive robustness tests. Section 6 presents a concluding
discussion along with implications for research, prac-
titioners, and policymakers.
2. Background
2.1. Institutional Regularities of Business Format
Franchising and the Lodging Industry
In this section, I brieﬂy describe four institutional reg-
ularities directly relevant to an analysis of encroach-
ment. First, as mentioned above, company-owned
brands co-exist with franchised brands in the lodging
industry. This regularity is surprising because trans-
actions cost explanations of franchising (Williamson
1991) and of the organization of distribution chan-
nels (Anderson 1985), as well as agency-theoretic
explanations of franchising (e.g., Lafontaine 1992, Lal
1990) predict that all ﬁrms engaging in the same
transaction should choose the same form of gover-
nance. Yet we observe chains such as Motel 6 and
Super 8 using company ownership and franchising,
respectively, even though the two brands appear to
engage in transactions almost identical with respect to
frequency, uncertainty, and asset speciﬁcity. Further,
with the exception of Motel 6 at the very end of the
study period, the lodging chains in this study do not
use dual distribution. They are largely committed to
either franchising or company ownership and do not
choose between the two governance forms on a unit-
by-unit basis.2
A second important institutional regularity is that
individual hotels commonly convert from one brand
to another (Khanna and Ganot 1995, Conlin 2003), a
behavior not often observed in other industries that
have a substantial amount of franchising. Conversions
by proximate units from other brands to an incum-
bent’s brand allow an analysis of encroachment effects
on the incumbent’s revenues without any confound-
ing effect of increased supply.
Third, the large, established franchised chains typi-
cally do not provide exclusive territories to franchisees
(Azoulay and Shane 2001). Of the franchised chains
in this study, only Super 8 offered territorial protec-
2 In contrast to lodging, dual distribution is very common among
fast food chains. Pizza Hut and Wendy’s company-owned 53%
and 39%, respectively, of their units in Texas in 1995 (Kalnins and
Lafontaine 2004). Brickley and Dark (1987) presented evidence that
restaurant franchisors choose between the governance forms on a
unit-by-unit basis based on ease of monitoring each unit. Yin and
Zajac (2004) suggest that the choice be made on the complexity of
the operations at the unit.
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tion for its franchisees throughout the 1990s (Patel and
Corgel 1995, Worcester 1998). Super 8 negotiated a dis-
tance radius with each franchisee, typically between
one and seven miles, within which the franchisor
would refrain from adding new same-brand units. The
Cendant corporation, owner of Day’s Inn, Ramada,
and Super 8, began to offer similar protection across all
its brands in late 1998 (Worcester 1998). Throughout
the 1990s, all franchisors in this study had “notiﬁca-
tion distances” within which they notiﬁed incumbent
franchisees of plans to open a new same-brand unit
using another franchisee. This distance is typically 15
miles or the third closest same-brand unit (Patel and
Corgel 1995). Franchisees could then petition against
the development of the new unit, but burden of proof
regarding encroachment typically has been placed on
the franchisee (Khanna and Ganot 1995).
Fourth, 90% of franchisors (and seven of the
eight franchised chains studied here) collect an
upfront ﬁxed fee and sales royalty from franchisees
(Lafontaine 1992). Best Western charges a ﬁxed fee
and an annual room-count fee. While theory often
emphasizes the role of a ﬁxed fee in the extraction of
all rents from downstream retailers, Lafontaine and
Shaw (1999) state that on average ﬁxed fees repre-
sent only 8% of all payments from franchisees to fran-
chisors, while the sales royalty accounts for the vast
remainder. Further, Kaufmann and Lafontaine (1994)
and Michael and Moore (1995) present empirical evi-
dence that franchisors are unable to extract all rents
via a ﬁxed fee (see also Villas-Boas 1998, pp. 166–167,
on this point). As will be discussed below, a reliance
on the sales royalty and the inability to extract all
rents via a ﬁxed fee gives franchisors more incentive
than company-owned ﬁrms to encroach on their exist-
ing properties.
2.2. Relevant Literatures
Industrial organization theory has long predicted
that prices and revenues of a market’s incumbent
ﬁrms will decrease if new ﬁrms enter that market.
This proposition has received substantial empirical
support. For example, Joskow et al. (1994) found
that entry reduced airline fares and increased over-
all output (but reduced output of incumbents) and
exit increased fares and reduced overall output.
The prediction that entry causes revenue losses for
incumbents is easily extended to the case of sales
locations differentiated by brand. Entry of a branded
unit will likely cause greater revenue losses for same-
brand incumbents than for other-brand units because
customers likely view the two same-brand units as the
closest substitutes, differentiated only geographically.
Consistent with this premise, recent studies have
found pricing patterns consistent with intrabrand
competition within the large branded lodging chains
(Conlin 2003) and fast-food chains (Kalnins 2003,
Thomadsen 2004). In addition, Ingram and Baum
(1997) found that a chain’s hotels in Manhattan were
less likely to survive when the chain operated more
units there.
The above arguments, while certainly suggestive
of encroachment, do not predict any differences in
behavior between company-owned and franchised
chains. Below, I discuss two theoretical arguments
that imply franchisors are more likely than company-
owned ﬁrms to make entry choices that cannibalize
revenues of same-brand incumbents.
The ﬁrst argument implying encroachment is that
franchising is a strategic device; use of the gover-
nance form allows ﬁrms to credibly commit to “strate-
gic toughness” toward rivals. In particular, upstream
ﬁrms divisionalize (i.e., franchise) to commit to a
higher level of output (Baye et al. 1996). The mecha-
nism at the core of Baye et al.’s argument is that ﬁrms
generate intrabrand quantity competition by division-
alizing, thus securing greater market share for the
brand overall.3 This logic implies that the behavior
of franchisors and company-owned ﬁrms will differ.
Consider a case where a market consists of two ﬁrms,
one committed to each of the two governance forms.
The company-owned ﬁrm will remain a single entity,
while the franchisor will create divisions until inhib-
ited from doing so by ﬁxed divisionalization costs.
Thus, the franchisor will capture greater market share.
Assuming that divisions are opened sequentially,
however, each incumbent division will lose revenues
as the new divisions begin operations. The company-
owned ﬁrm will locate additional units only in new
markets, implying that revenues at existing locations
will not go down when new units are added.
A second argument implying a greater likelihood
of encroachment within franchised chains is based on
the institutional regularity that business format fran-
chisors receive a sales royalty from franchisees, rather
than a proﬁt royalty, and cannot extract remaining
rents via a ﬁxed fee. Kaufmann and Rangan (1990)
modeled the resulting conﬂicts, which do not in any
way depend on active intrabrand competition among
franchisees. Franchisors have incentives to approve
new units as long as the revenues at the new loca-
tion are greater than the resulting revenue losses at
existing locations. Further, they are likely to ﬁnd fran-
chisees willing to build new units in any location
with positive expected proﬁts (taking into account the
possibility of encroachment).4 The company-owned
3 Intrabrand competition may also facilitate extraction of rents from
the franchisees. See, e.g., Desiraju (2004).
4 The franchisees are not likely to have a signiﬁcant reservation
wage outside the franchise relationship. Knott (2001), for exam-
ple, found that print-shop franchisees who voluntarily severed ties
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Table 1 Hotel Counts of 10 Largest Chains in Texas, 1991–2000
Hotel count Entries Exits Hotel count
(Jan. 1991) (1991–1999) (1991–1999) (Jan. 2000)
Franch. Co-own. Franch. Co-own. Franch. Co-own. Franch. Co-own.
Franchised Brands
Holiday Inn 77 13 89 5 34 4 132 14
Best Western 65 0 105 0 26 0 144 0
Comfort Inn 26 2 94 0 15 1 105 1
Econolodge 27 0 26 0 20 0 33 0
Days Inn 55 0 100 0 27 0 128 0
Ramada 37 0 76 0 31 0 82 0
Super 8 14 0 73 0 4 0 83 0
Hampton Inn 16 2 41 3 2 0 55 5
Total 317 17 604 8 159 5 762 20
Co-owned Brands
La Quinta 3 79 0 22 0 1 3 100
Motel 6 1 73 12 20 2 8 11 85
Total 4 152 12 42 2 9 14 185
Note. Holiday Inn includes the Holiday Inn Express brand extension; Ramada includes Ramada Limited; and Comfort
Inn includes Comfort Suites.
ﬁrms, compensated directly by their units’ proﬁt,
should choose only locations where proﬁts at the
new unit outweigh any resulting losses at neighbor-
ing locations. Because this constraint is more strin-
gent than that faced by the franchisors, there exists
a set of locations where company-owned ﬁrms will
refrain from opening units but where franchisors
will not hesitate to open units. Therefore, we should
observe greater revenue losses at incumbent units due
to encroachment within the franchised chains than
within the company-owned chains.
One ﬁnal argument is considered that does not
imply negative encroachment effects. Additional units
in a market may lead to a brand awareness externality
as well as economies of scale in marketing (Blair and
Lafontaine 2002). Those authors highlight the fact that
franchisors have often been accused by franchisees of
opening too few units within a market, as well as
too many. If the value of the incumbent’s brand is
enhanced due to same-brand entry in its vicinity, we
should observe revenue gains at the incumbent units
of the franchised as well as company-owned chains.
More generally, by agglomerating, groups of retail or
service businesses could attract more customers than
the sum of those the group members would attract
in isolation, as long as personal inspection is required
to assess product heterogeneity (Fischer and Harring-
ton 1996). Chung and Kalnins (2001) argue that hotels
are likely to meet this criterion, a point also made
by hotel executives (Khanna and Ganot 1995, p. 8).
with their franchisor but maintained operations consistently suf-
fered lower revenues and proﬁts after the severance.
If agglomeration effects outweigh competitive effects
across brands, we should observe revenue gains at
incumbent units arising from proximate entry by
hotels of the same brand as well as those of other
brands.
3. Data
3.1. Source of Data
I analyzed publicly available data provided by the
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts. The popula-
tion consists of all lodging establishments that oper-
ated in Texas at any time between January 1990 and
December 1999. In addition to quarterly taxable rev-
enues for each hotel, the data include the owner name
and address, business name (including any brand
afﬁliation) and address, and room count. The tax-
able revenues include only those earned from room
rental. The quarterly revenues divided by the room
count, a standard performance measure used in the
industry, is the dependent variable in all regressions.
The data set also includes entry and exit dates for
each brand/owner/location combination. Every time
an ownership transfer of a hotel takes place, a new
“entry date” is included for the hotel for the new
owner. Similarly, if an establishment changes brand,
separate dates are usually included. The data set does
not include any information about pricing of rooms
or levels of occupancy.
3.2. Empirical Regularities
Table 1 shows the distribution of franchised and
company-owned hotels in Texas in the 1990s and con-
ﬁrms that the ten largest brands are mostly limited
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to only one governance form. Among the eight hotel
brands that are primarily franchised, only 20 units
(or 2.5%) out of 782 are company-owned. La Quinta
and Motel 6 franchised only 14 (or 7%) out of 199
total properties operating in 1999. A majority of the
12 franchised Motel 6 units were added in 1998 or
1999, when the company began franchising on a reg-
ular basis.
Table 1 also shows that La Quinta and Motel 6
were among the largest brands in 1991, with 82 and
74 units, respectively. Only Holiday Inn (including
the Holiday Inn Express brand extension) was larger,
with 90 units. The initial large size of La Quinta
and Motel 6 suggests that, if not taking company
ownership into account, we should be most likely to
observe encroachment within these chains. However,
La Quinta added 22 units and Motel 6 added 32 units,
while 7 of the 8 franchised chains added more than
32 units. The large initial unit count of the company-
owned brands is not likely the cause of their slow
growth, I argue, because Holiday Inn and Holiday Inn
Express added 94 units despite its initial large size.
Unlike the franchisors, the company-owned brands
may have been adding locations more slowly because
they were refraining from opening properties at some
locations that lowered their overall proﬁts.
Though not listed separately in Table 1, brand con-
versions are a common if not dominant phenomenon
in the lodging industry. Among the 612 entries of the
eight franchised brands, 81 (or 13%) were conversions
from any of the 62 brands operating in Texas in the
1990s, while the rest were newly branded foundings.
Among the 164 exits that took place among the fran-
chised chains, 76 (or 46%) were conversions to any
other brand and the rest were closings, i.e., hotels that
ceased to be branded operations. Of these 76 hotels,
48 were upscale before the conversion, but only 33
were upscale after. Khanna and Ganot (1995, p. 3)
noted that hotels often convert to brands of lower tier
to avoid major renovations demanded by the upscale
franchisors. An additional 127 hotels converted from
nonbranded properties to the ten brands analyzed in
this study. In the results presented below, these were
not treated as conversions but rather as new found-
ings. Twenty-eight properties converted from one of
the ten brands to a nonbranded property. These were
treated as closings.
Finally, I note that the company-owned chains
closed down fewer hotels than the franchised chains,
suggesting greater care taken in the initial location
choice. Only nine hotels of the two company-owned
brands closed in the 1990s (4.5% of the 199 that
were open in 1999), while 94 hotels of the fran-
chised chains (12% of the 782 that were open in 1999)
closed.
3.3. Data Sets Used for Analysis
The data sets used in the ﬁnal analyses consist of
16,205 quarterly observations for 1,128 brand/owner/
location combinations afﬁliated with the 8 franchised
hotel brands, and 5,942 quarterly observations for 187
combinations of the large company-owned brands.
These two data sets are analyzed separately. The raw
data for all 10 brands included 28,160 quarterly obser-
vations. Of these, 4 separate groups of data, a total of
6013 observations, were removed.
First, while 1993 quarterly observations exist from
the year 1990, these data could not be included in the
analyses because lagged revenues were needed for
a spatial lag variable. Second, 600 observations were
removed for quarters within which a closing, owner-
ship change, or brand conversion took place, because
such changes yielded artiﬁcially low revenues. Third,
some hotels reported zero revenues for some calen-
dar quarters, possibly from remodeling efforts. To
avoid spurious revenue heterogeneity arising from
these temporary closings, I removed all 2711 observa-
tions associated with the 186 brand/owner/location
combinations that reported zero revenues for one
or more quarters. Fourth, because this study com-
pares encroachment effects between franchised and
company-owned chains, I removed 517 observations
associated with company-owned brand/owner/loca-
tion combinations within the franchised chains, and
192 observations associated with franchised combina-
tions of the two company-owned brands.
As discussed in the robustness tests section, signif-
icance levels of the results presented below did not
change when the additional observations associated
with each of the four groups of data were included.
I note that all hotels afﬁliated with each chain, regard-
less of whether company-owned or franchised and
even when not included as observations of analysis,
are included in the entry and exit count independent
variables described below.
4. Research Design
4.1. Method
I estimated two-factor ﬁxed-effects regression mod-
els with a dependent variable of taxable revenues per
room per calendar quarter. A ﬁxed effect is included
for every distinct brand/owner/location combination.
In other words, an additional intercept is assigned
to the same hotel every time an ownership transfer
or brand conversion took place. By controlling for
the inﬂuence of brand and owner idiosyncrasies in
this fashion, I can capture encroachment effects with
a lower likelihood of confounding factors that could
generate revenue heterogeneity.
A ﬁxed effect is also included for every brand/year
combination. Yearly intercepts capture exogenous
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economic shocks as well as overall growth and inﬂa-
tion. I include separate yearly effects for each brand
to eliminate the possibility that effects attributed to
encroachment variables actually result from periods
of discontinuous growth for a brand. This is a concern
because the greater the growth of a brand, the more
likely that new units afﬁliated with that brand will
encroach on incumbent units. Simpler speciﬁcations
with only a year effect in place of the year/brand
effect, or with only a single time trend variable,
yielded results of marginally greater economic mag-
nitude and with identical signiﬁcance levels to those
presented below.
While ﬁxed effects are used exclusively through-
out the analysis, I also considered the use of ran-
dom effects models. However, for every speciﬁcation
I estimated, the Hausman test resoundingly rejected
(at p < 0001) the null hypothesis that the coefﬁcients
of the ﬁxed and random effects models are identi-
cal, indicating that the random effects approach is
inappropriate.
4.2. Independent Variables: Deﬁnitions of the
Encroachment Area
I deﬁned hotels opened between 1991 and 1999 as
encroaching on an incumbent hotel of the same
brand if the new hotel appears within the incum-
bent’s “encroachment area.” With the intent of deﬁn-
ing an area within which customers are likely to
view two same-brand hotels as substitutes, I deﬁned
the encroachment area as the distance to a speci-
ﬁed ordinally proximate branded chain hotel (e.g., the
10th closest) from the incumbent. To measure these
distances, I obtained latitude and longitude coordi-
nates based on street address for all branded hotels in
Texas. Using these coordinates, I calculated the geo-
graphic distance from the 10th, 15th, and 20th closest
hotel operating in 1995 to the incumbent’s location.
I deﬁned all encroachment areas based on hotels exist-
ing in 1995 to keep the area constant throughout each
hotel’s life span.
The main beneﬁt of the “closest hotel” approach is
that it allows the encroachment area to vary in size,
to take into account greatly differing population and
commercial densities. In rural areas, the distance to
the 10th-closest hotel may be 30 or 40 miles, while
in urban areas this distance may be as little as two
miles. These both likely represent valid areas within
which hotels of the same brand are viewed as sub-
stitutes by consumers. In rural areas, consumers are
likely to view geographically distant hotels as substi-
tutes if they are at major exits of the same highway,
for example (see Patel and Corgel 1995, Footnote 5).
Completely exogenous administrative boundaries
(e.g., counties, metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs),
zip codes) or ﬁxed mileage distance radii are not
usable as encroachment areas. Counties and MSAs
vary far too greatly in terms of size. Harris County
(home of Houston) had 114 hotels of the ten brands
of this study in 1999, while Deaf Smith County had
only one, a Best Western. The Houston MSA had
136 hotels of the ten brands, while the San Angelo
MSA had only nine. Zip codes have been used to
examine the agglomeration of the hotels of multiple
brands (Chung and Kalnins 2001), but zips are too
small to capture the effects of encroachment. In the
Texas data, only 18 hotels were opened in zip codes
with an incumbent of the same brand. Finally, ﬁxed
mileage radii present problems because of hotel den-
sity variation across different locations, as mentioned
above. However, regressions were estimated with the
10th, 15th, and 20th closest hotel distances further
circumscribed by a 25-mile cutoff. As discussed in
the robustness test section, these results were even
stronger than those presented.
4.3. Independent Variables: Entries and Exits
within the Encroachment Area
All same-brand hotels that entered an incumbent’s
encroachment area during its life span are added to
the “entries of same brand” variable, from the time of
entry onward. In some regressions, the entry variable
is split into two components, “conversions to same
brand” and “same-brand foundings.” Only four units
converted from other brands to the two company-
owned brands, so conversions and foundings are not
analyzed separately for these two brands.
All hotels of the same brand that exited within an
incumbent’s encroachment area are included in the
“exits of same brand” variable from their date of exit
onward. Like the corresponding entry variable, the
“exits of same brand” variable is split into two com-
ponents, “conversions from same brand” and “clos-
ings of same brand.” For La Quinta and Motel 6, only
two units were converted to other brands, while only
nine closed down. For this reason, the revenue effects
of exits could not be analyzed for the two company-
owned brands.
In the analysis of the franchised brands, a new
same-brand hotel in the vicinity of an incumbent
unit is added to the “entries of same brand” vari-
able even if both hotels are owned by the same fran-
chisee. While multiunit franchisees that own several
proximate units are common in fast-food franchising
(see, e.g., Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004), there are too
few cases here of the same franchisee owning a new
hotel close to an existing same-brand unit to analyze
these cases separately. Among the 1,128 franchised
brand/owner/location combinations included in the
analysis, only for 11 did the same owner open another
hotel of the same brand closer than the 10th branded
hotel, and this number increased only to 14 for the
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closest 20th. Results did not change when these hotels
were removed from the entry and exit counts.
4.4. Deﬁnitions of Other Independent Variables
Counts of new hotels of other brands within the
encroachment area are also included so that the same-
brand and other-brand entry effects can be compared.
I count separately the upscale and economy hotels to
distinguish between competition from same-tier and
other-tier hotels. This approach also allows an exam-
ination of possible agglomeration beneﬁts that may
outweigh competitive effects in some cases, partic-
ularly between hotels of different tiers (Baum and
Haveman 1997, Kalnins and Chung 2004). If a given
hotel is “upscale,” then the counts of upscale hotels
of other brands are included in the “new same-
tier/other-brand hotels” variable; if the given hotel is
“economy,” then this variable consists of other econ-
omy brands. The “new other-tier hotels” variable con-
sists of the count of upscale entries for an economy
hotel and vice versa. The upscale brands were split
from the economy brands based on a brand’s average
AAA rating in Texas of 2.5 stars in the 1998 guidebook.
Holiday Inn, Comfort Inn, La Quinta, and Hampton
Inn are considered upscale; Comfort Inn was the low-
est ranked upscale chain, with 2.74 stars. Best Western,
Econolodge, Ramada, Days Inn, Super 8, and Motel 6
are economy brands; Ramada was the highest econ-
omy chain, with an average of 2.44 stars.
While the brand/owner/location combination ﬁxed
effects eliminate any inﬂuence of time-invariant
regional heterogeneity and the brand/year intercepts
similarly eliminate temporal effects, they do not elim-
inate heterogeneity that is both time- and region-
speciﬁc. A region might experience sudden economic
growth, for example, causing both higher revenues
for existing units and entry of new units. If not con-
trolled for, temporal/regional heterogeneity can bias
results against the ﬁnding of encroachment effects.
The extensive spatial econometrics literature (e.g.,
Anselin 1988, Kalnins 2003) uses “spatial lag” vari-
ables as a control. I constructed the spatial lag using
the average of revenues per room at other existing
branded hotels within the encroachment area, tempo-
rally lagged by one year to avoid simultaneity biases.
I include the number of retail establishments in the
zip code where the hotel is located, as well as the net
change of retail establishments from the year previous
to that of the given observation. I include dummies
for spring, summer, and autumn because many hotels
in Texas exhibit substantial seasonal variation in rev-
enues. Coefﬁcients of the seasonal dummies are not
included in the tables to conserve space, but they are
present in all regressions.
Table 2 presents two sets of descriptive statistics,
one for the eight franchised brands and one for
the two company-owned brands. In addition to the
standard statistics of mean, standard deviation, mini-
mum and maximum, the table presents a ﬁfth column
marked “NonZ.” This column shows the number
of brand/owner/location combinations for which at
least one (i.e., a nonzero count) same-brand entry
(or exit) takes place in the incumbent’s encroachment
areas while that incumbent is in operation. For exam-
ple, the ﬁrst value in the NonZ column for the fran-
chised brands states that for 220 incumbent brand/
owner/location combinations, at least one entry of the
same brand took place within the “10th closest” deﬁ-
nition of the incumbent’s encroachment area. The next
two values in the column indicate that at least one
brand conversion took place within the “10th closest”
encroachment area for 30 incumbents, and at least one
founding took place within this area for 200 incum-
bents. Ten hotels were affected by both an encroach-
ing conversion and a founding.
Beyond the information given in the descriptive
statistics, I note that the company-owned chains
located their hotels slightly closer to their existing
hotels than did the franchised chains. When a same-
brand entry occurred closer to an incumbent than the
10th closest branded hotel, on average the entrant
was 5.91 hotels away for the franchised chains, and
5.64 hotels away for the company owned chains.
Entrants within the 15th closest area were, on aver-
age, 8.92 hotels away for the franchised chains and
8.30 hotels away for the company-owned chains. For
the 20th closest, these numbers are 11.41 and 10.71,
respectively.
In addition, entries and exits rarely take place in
the same area, so they do not represent the build-
ing of replacement facilities. Using the “10th closest”
encroachment area deﬁnition, of the 220 franchised
incumbent hotels that experienced same-brand entry,
only 37 also experienced a same-brand exit. Using the
“15th closest” deﬁnition, of the 337 franchised incum-
bents that experienced encroachment, only 57 also
experienced a same-brand exit.
5. Results
5.1. Core Results
Table 3 presents results from two-factor ﬁxed-effects
regressions. The ﬁrst six columns show results for
the eight franchised chains, and the last three present
results for the company-owned brands. For the fran-
chised chains, the ﬁrst two columns use the “10th
closest” deﬁnition of the encroachment area, the third
and fourth use the 15th closest, and the ﬁfth and
sixth use the 20th closest. Two regressions are pre-
sented using each distance cutoff. The ﬁrst uses the
“entries of same brand” and “exits of same brand”
variables. The second splits the “entry” variable into
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Franchised and Company-Owned Brands
Franchised chains Company-owned brands
Mean SDev Min Max NonZ Mean SDev Min Max NonZ
Revenues per room ($000s) 229 114 000 1331 257 099 028 680
Encroach. area 10th closest hotel
Entries of same brand 020 051 0 5 220 008 031 0 2 27
Conversions to same brand 002 015 0 1 30 003 021 0 2 8
Same-brand foundings 018 047 0 5 200 005 022 0 2 20
New same-tier/other-brand hotels 135 178 0 18 228 250 0 18
New other-tier hotels 141 183 0 18 214 238 0 16
Exits of same brand 005 025 0 2 55 003 017 0 1 6
Conversions from same brand 003 016 0 1 27 001 011 0 1 2
Same-brand closings 003 017 0 2 31 002 014 0 1 4
Same-tier/other-brand closings 015 039 0 3 025 052 0 3
Other-tier closings 012 037 0 3 032 058 0 4
Spatially lagged revenues ($000s) 267 099 056 1015 270 095 082 948
Encroach. area 15th closest hotel
Entries of same brand 035 066 0 6 337 013 039 0 2 44
Conversions to same brand 004 019 0 1 48 005 024 0 2 10
Same-brand foundings 031 062 0 6 312 009 031 0 2 35
New same-tier/other-brand hotels 206 247 0 22 344 339 0 21
New other-tier hotels 213 248 0 20 316 328 0 21
Exits of same brand 008 030 0 2 96 003 017 0 1 6
Conversions from same brand 004 020 0 2 43 001 011 0 1 2
Same-brand closings 004 021 0 2 56 002 014 0 1 4
Same-tier/other-brand closings 023 050 0 4 043 070 0 4
Other-tier closings 021 048 0 4 051 074 0 5
Spatially lagged revenues ($000s) 271 096 074 838 275 097 100 818
Encroach. area 20th closest hotel
Entries of same brand 049 084 0 7 418 018 044 0 3 55
Conversions to same brand 005 023 0 2 69 005 025 0 2 11
Same-brand foundings 044 079 0 7 391 013 036 0 2 47
New same-tier/other-brand hotels 274 306 0 26 462 432 0 25
New other-tier hotels 285 315 0 24 428 416 0 24
Exits of same brand 011 034 0 2 127 004 019 0 1 8
Conversions from same brand 005 023 0 2 60 001 011 0 1 2
Same-brand closings 006 024 0 2 72 003 016 0 1 6
Same-tier/other-brand closings 029 059 0 6 061 086 0 4
Other-tier closings 028 059 0 4 070 087 0 5
Spatially lagged revenues ($000s) 274 092 089 764 277 091 107 682
Retail count in zip (00s) 029 018 000 102 033 020 000 102
Net retail additions in zip 001 002 −007 032 002 003 −007 015
the number of conversions and the number of same-
brand foundings. The “exits” variable is split into the
number of conversions to other brands and the num-
ber of same-brand closings. Only three columns, with
the “entries of same brand” variable, are presented for
the company-owned brands. Splits of this variable are
not presented because only four brand conversions
to these two chains took place in the 1990s. In addi-
tion, the “exits of same brand” variable could not be
included because the company-owned brands experi-
enced only 11 exits.
The “entries of same brand” variable is negative
and signiﬁcant in columns 1, 3, and 5, indicating that
within the eight franchised chains, revenues of incum-
bent hotels signiﬁcantly decrease when a proximate
same-brand unit is added. A new same-brand unit
within the closest 10 hotels is associated with a loss
of $66 per room each quarter, while a same-brand
hotel among the closest 20 is associated with a loss of
$51. Because the mean hotel size among the 10 chains
studied here is 110 rooms, the revenue losses asso-
ciated with same-brand entry translate into a loss of
between $7,360 and $5,610 per quarter, or between
2.7% and 2% of the mean revenues.
The results for hotels of the company-owned
brands are presented in columns 7–9 of Table 3. The
difference between the proximate same-brand entry
effects for the franchised brands and the company-
owned brands is striking. A new entrant of the same
brand is associated with a per-room quarterly gain of
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Table 3 Two-Factor Fixed Effects Regressions on Quarterly Revenues per Room
Franchised hotel chains: 16,205 quarterly observations for Company-owned hotel chains:
1,128 brand/owner/location combinations 5942 Obs. for 187 B/O/Locs.
Closest 10 Closest 15 Closest 20
Closest 10 Closest 15 Closest 20
Encroachment area deﬁned as: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Entries of same brand −6681∗∗$ −643∗∗$$ −510∗∗$$ 11932∗∗ 9608∗∗ 7449∗∗
1555 1237 1030 3025 2194 1910
Conversions to same brand −7156 −8053∗ −8516∗∗
4704 3940 3227
Same-brand foundings −6603∗∗ −6212∗∗ −4746∗∗
1655 1302 1088
New same-tier/other-brand hotels −3627∗∗ −3633∗∗ −3041∗∗ −3073∗∗ −2565∗∗ −2609∗∗ −4620∗∗ −3457∗∗ −3476∗∗
496 496 385 386 334 335 450 359 291
New other-tier hotels −1709∗∗ −1708∗∗ −502 −505 −613+ −614+ −1571∗∗ −2441∗∗ −2424∗∗
498 498 411 411 344 344 462 356 297
Exits of same brand 5432 1285∗∗$$ 1021∗∗$$
3628 2888 2494
Conversions from same brand 6662 17173∗∗ 16485∗∗
5893 4603 3806
Same-brand closings 4682 10118∗∗ 5667+
4608 3646 3214
Same-tier/other-brand closings 3460 3475+ 3022+ 3086+ 2551+ 2553+ 11927∗∗ 8488∗∗ 7783∗∗
2108 2109 1681 1681 1484 1484 1809 1434 1244
Other-tier closings 6678∗∗ 6677∗∗ 880 782 127 008 −857 2054 3660∗∗
2202 2202 1787 1789 1536 1539 1861 1451 1285
Retail count in zip code 083∗∗ 083∗∗ 085∗∗ 084∗∗ 081∗∗ 080∗∗ 063∗∗ 084∗∗ 054∗∗
018 018 018 018 018 018 019 019 019
Net retail additions in zip code 085∗∗ 085∗∗ 070∗ 071∗ 066∗ 067∗ 081∗∗ 060+ 053+
031 031 031 031 031 031 031 031 030
Spatially lagged revenues 034∗∗ 034∗∗ 037∗∗ 037∗∗ 040∗∗ 040∗∗ 034∗∗ 034∗∗ 040∗∗
001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001 001
R-squared 026 026 026 026 026 026 046 047 049
Note. There are separate ﬁxed effects for each brand/owner/location combination and each brand/calendar quarter combination.
+ p < 010.
∗ p < 005.
∗∗ p < 001 in two-tailed tests.
$$ Indicates that “Entries of same brand” is signiﬁcantly greater in magnitude than “New same-tier/other brand hotels” (or “Exits of same brand” is greater
than “Same-tier/other brand closings”) at p < 005 via an F -test; $ same at p < 010.
$119 to $75, depending on the size of the encroach-
ment area.
When the “entries of same brand” variable is split
into “conversions of same brand” and “same-brand
foundings” for the franchised chains in columns 2, 4,
and 6, both of these variables are negative and sig-
niﬁcant. The sole exception is the conversions vari-
able within the 10-hotel encroachment area, which is
shy of statistical signiﬁcance (p= 0138). Conversions
reduce existing hotels’ revenue by $71 to $86, depend-
ing on the encroachment area, while foundings reduce
revenues by $66 to $47. The reason for the larger effect
of brand conversions is probably because they are
larger hotels. I discuss this issue in the “robustness
tests” section below.
In contrast to same-brand entry, same-tier/other-
brand entry within an incumbent’s encroachment area
consistently has signiﬁcantly negative revenue effects,
not only for the franchised chains but also for the
company-owned brands. For the franchised chains,
the losses to incumbents due to same-brand entries
are signiﬁcantly greater than the losses associated with
new same-tier/other-brand hotels; an F -test on the dif-
ference between the two coefﬁcients is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at p < 010 for the “10th closest hotel” deﬁni-
tion and at p < 005 for the 15th closest and 20th closest
deﬁnitions. New other-tier hotels within the encroach-
ment area also cause signiﬁcant losses: between $17
and $6, depending on the encroachment area.
Turning now to exits, the “exits of same brand”
variable is positive and signiﬁcant in columns 3 and 5,
indicating that in the case of the eight franchised
chains, revenues of incumbent hotels signiﬁcantly
increase when a hotel of the same brand is shut down
or converted to another brand in their vicinity. The
exit of a same-brand hotel within the closest 15 and
20 hotels is associated with a gain of $129 and $102,
respectively, per room per quarter.
The “exits of same brand” variable is split into
“conversions from same brand” and “same-brand
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closings” in columns 2, 4, and 6. Conversions to a
different brand are associated with increases in exist-
ing hotels’ revenue of $172 for the 15th closest hotel
deﬁnition of the encroachment area, and $165 for the
“20th closest” deﬁnition, while the closing down of a
same-brand hotel increases revenues by $101 and $57
for these two encroachment area deﬁnitions. Same-
tier/other-brand exits are positive and marginally sig-
niﬁcant, but other-tier exits within an incumbent’s
encroachment area have negligible revenue effects for
franchised incumbent hotels.
The retail count and growth variables in a hotel’s
zip code are consistently signiﬁcant, indicating a rev-
enue gain of between 54 and 83 cents per existing
retail business, while the net change in retail estab-
lishments from the previous year is associated with
an additional gain similar in magnitude. The spa-
tial lags, i.e., the lagged revenues of other existing
branded hotels within the encroachment area, are
highly signiﬁcant. The lagged revenues have coefﬁ-
cients of between 0.34 and 0.40, indicating that over
one-third of the revenue variance for each hotel across
calendar quarters is the result of a temporal-spatial
effect common to all branded hotels in the area. This
strong result illustrates the importance of controlling
for temporal-spatial effects beyond those captured by
the brand/owner/location and brand/calendar quar-
ter ﬁxed effects.
5.2. Subsample Results (Chain-by-Chain and
Urban vs. Rural Areas)
To eliminate the possibility that results within one or
two of the chains are driving the overall economic
and statistical signiﬁcance, the speciﬁcations of the
columns 1, 3, and 5 in Table 3 were estimated for each
chain individually. Statistically signiﬁcant and nega-
tive encroachment effects of same-brand entry were
found for at least one of the three encroachment area
deﬁnitions (10th, 15th, or 20th closest) for six of the
eight franchised chains; four chains showed negative
and signiﬁcant effects for two of the three area deﬁni-
tions. Both the company-owned brands Motel 6 and
La Quinta exhibited positive and signiﬁcant effects
associated with new hotels opening in the vicinity of
their existing ones when analyzed separately, much
like their joint effects presented in Table 3.
Interestingly, Super 8 was the only franchised brand
that exhibited a positive and signiﬁcant effect of
new hotels opening in the vicinity of their existing
ones. The signiﬁcant effect was present when deﬁn-
ing the encroachment area as the 10th or 15th closest
hotel. This ﬁnding is interesting because, as discussed
above in §2, Super 8 was the only franchised chain
that gave franchisees some territorial protection from
encroachment throughout the 1990s. However, cau-
tion is required in interpreting the Super 8 results as
an effect of the chain’s protection clause, because two
other variables (other-tier exits and net retail addi-
tions in zip code) exhibited signiﬁcance in the oppo-
site direction from the pooled regressions of Table 3.
I also split the sample into urban and rural subsam-
ples. When estimated separately, the results of both
subsamples were completely consistent with those of
Table 3, other than one interesting exception: For the
franchised chains, the “new other-tier hotels” is posi-
tive and signiﬁcant in rural areas. Chung and Kalnins
(2001) suggested that demand-based agglomeration
effects should be particularly important for hotels in
rural areas such as highway exits, because the clus-
ter of hotels itself is likely to become the primary
attraction in those areas. Both upscale and economy
hotels beneﬁted from the presence of other-tier entry,
indicating that agglomeration beneﬁts are mutualis-
tic as suggested by Baum and Haveman (1997) and
not asymmetric as suggested by Kalnins and Chung
(2004).
5.3. Encroachment by Other Brands of the Same
Franchisor Corporation
The analysis above treats all brands as identical in
the deﬁnition of the “new same-tier” and “new other-
tier” variables. As mentioned above, some franchisors
own multiple brands. Choice Hotels owns the Com-
fort and Econolodge brands, while Cendant owns
Ramada, Days Inn, and Super 8. Franchisees of these
brands have complained that encroachment can come
not only from new hotels of their own brand but also
from others owned by the same franchisor. There-
fore, a “new same franchisor corporation” variable
was created, and the hotels were not included in the
counts for the “tiers” variables. While the revenue
losses to existing hotels associated with the hotels of
the same franchisor were slightly larger than those for
others of different franchisors but of the same tier, the
null hypothesis that these coefﬁcients were the same
could not be rejected.
5.4. Additional Robustness Tests
I conducted many additional robustness tests to be
certain that the results presented above are not an
artifact of any individual speciﬁcation. These tests,
discussed in detail below, support the notion that a
negative encroachment effect is substantive and per-
vasive throughout the franchised hotel chains, while
this is not the case for the company-owned brands.
First, as discussed above, I removed 517 obser-
vations associated with 32 company-owned brand/
owner/location combinations within the franchised
chains, and 192 observations associated with 16 fran-
chised combinations within the 2 company-owned
brands. Regressions that included these observations
along with the rest for their respective chains showed
identical signiﬁcance levels as those in Table 3.
Kalnins: An Empirical Analysis of Territorial Encroachment Within Franchised and Company-Owned Branded Chains
486 Marketing Science 23(4), pp. 476–489, © 2004 INFORMS
Second, also discussed above, some hotels have
discontinuous revenue declines in certain quarters,
which possibly stem from major remodeling efforts.
For this reason, the results in Table 3 excluded all
observations for brand/owner/location combinations
that listed zero revenues at some point during their
operation. When the zero-revenue brand/owner/
location combinations were included, the results were
as statistically signiﬁcant as those in Table 3. To fur-
ther ensure that revenue outliers were not driving the
results, I estimated regressions after removing the 5%
of brand/owner/location combinations that had the
lowest revenues at some point during their operations
(in addition to the zero-revenue combinations), and
the 5% with the highest revenues. The results of these
regressions are very similar to those of Table 3, but
the coefﬁcients associated with the “entries of same-
brand” variable are reduced by approximately 25%.
Third, to be assured that the three ordinals, the
10th, 15th, and 20th closest branded hotel, were not
generating idiosyncratic results, I estimated 33 regres-
sions using every ordinal from the 4th to the 36th clos-
est hotel as a radius for the encroachment area. For
the franchised chains, encroachment effects are sub-
stantial (losses of more than $30 per room per quar-
ter) using radii of anywhere between the 6th and 24th
closest hotel. All radii between the 8th and 22nd clos-
est hotels were signiﬁcant at p < 005. The 12th closest
hotel radius maximizes the R-squared. The gains per
room for the company-owned hotels are statistically
signiﬁcant (and over $30) over a broader range, up to
the 35th closest hotel.
Fourth, a ﬁxed-distance 25-mile radius was added
to the “closest hotel” distances to further circumscribe
the encroachment area. In other words, only hotels
within the closest 10th, 15th, or 20th hotels, and within
25 miles, were included in the encroachment area.
Results using these deﬁnitions were even stronger,
both in signiﬁcance levels and economic magnitude,
than those shown in Table 3. In particular, the “same-
brand closings” variable using all three encroachment
area deﬁnitions and the “conversions to same brand”
variable for the “10th closest” encroachment area def-
inition became highly signiﬁcant.
Fifth, the results in Table 3 show that the effects of
conversion entries and exits on the revenues of same-
brand incumbents are greater in magnitude than
the effects of openings and closings. These differ-
ences probably occur because conversions are larger
(133 rooms) than new entrants (110 rooms). Regres-
sions that deﬁned the entry and exit variables in terms
of number of rooms showed that, per room, con-
version entries and exits have a slightly lower rev-
enue effect on incumbent hotels than do openings and
closings.
5.5. Limitations
The results presented in this paper provide the ﬁrst
systematic evidence regarding the economic impor-
tance of encroachment, but the results here are lim-
ited to one U.S. state and one industry. It is hoped
that other researchers will ﬁnd the data to analyze
encroachment effects in other industries and geo-
graphic regions; additional work is clearly necessary
to conﬁrm or deny that encroachment is pervasive
throughout the domain of franchising. Nevertheless,
attributes of Texas as well as the hotel industry sug-
gest that the ﬁndings here could indeed be general-
izable. Texas is a large state with a wide variety of
location types (e.g., urban, rural, major highways, and
coastal resorts) that appear representative of those
existing throughout the United States. While the hotel
industry has some idiosyncrasies (lack of dual distri-
bution within chains, properties that switch brands),
the main structural features that lead to encroachment
(market saturation, royalties based on sales rather
than proﬁts) are also present not only in lodging but
also in other major franchised industries such as fast
food.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
6.1. Discussion
Cumulatively, the results presented in this paper pro-
vide the ﬁrst systematic evidence of encroachment.
The main ﬁnding supporting encroachment is that
within franchised chains, new units signiﬁcantly can-
nibalize the revenues of proximate same-brand units.
The results for the company-owned chains provide
a stark contrast. While the units of the franchised
and company-owned chains lose an almost identi-
cal amount of revenue following the entry of same-
tier/other-brand units in their vicinity, the addition
of a new unit by a company-owned brand is associ-
ated with a revenue increase at the chain’s incumbent
units. Even among organizations such as the economy
motel chains that appear indistinguishable in terms
of physical assets, market niche, and transaction type,
governance form clearly matters.
In addition, this paper presents evidence that an
incumbent and an entrant must be afﬁliated with
the same brand for noteworthy encroachment effects
to occur. While same-tier/other-brand entry has a
consistently negative and signiﬁcant effect, incum-
bents lose signiﬁcantly more revenues from same-
brand entry than from same-tier/other-brand entry.
This result implies that encroachment is not merely
a competitive effect that results from a greater sup-
ply of same-tier hotels in a market. Supporting this
point further is the ﬁnding that conversions by units
of different brands to an incumbent’s brand also have
a large negative effect on the incumbent’s revenues
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without increasing the market’s supply at all. Thus, if
there is any brand externality, it is clearly outweighed
by the negative effects of encroachment.
The paper also presented economically and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant results regarding same-brand
exits. When units exit in the vicinity of same-brand
incumbents, the incumbents enjoy substantial revenue
increases. These beneﬁcial effects of same-brand exits
complement the detrimental effects of same-brand
entry to support the idea that changes in same-brand
market presence have the most substantial impact on
an incumbent’s bottom line.
As the analyses are not structural, the results
should be interpreted as causal only with strong the-
oretical justiﬁcation. Two such justiﬁcations were dis-
cussed in this paper for the revenue-reducing effect
of same-brand entry within franchised chains. First,
franchisors may be divisionalizing strategically in
order to credibly commit to more market share. Like
the divisions in the model of Baye et al. (1996),
franchisees may actively compete against each other,
resulting in lower proﬁts for each franchisee but
greater market share for their brand overall. Sec-
ond, the franchisors’ royalty structure gives them
incentives to approve more new units than would
the company-owned brands (Kaufmann and Rangan
1990). Existing franchised units will be more likely
to experience encroachment than will be company-
owned units as a result of either of these logics.
The positive relationship between incumbent rev-
enues and same-brand entry within the company-
owned chains, on the other hand, is more likely a
correlation generated by unobservable market-level
demand heterogeneity than a causal result. Increas-
ing demand in a market will raise incumbents’
revenues and attract entrants. While I included a
spatially lagged dependent variable to control for
regional/temporal heterogeneity, remaining unob-
servables probably explain at least some portion of
the company-owned incumbents’ revenue rise that
follows same-brand entry. A possible causal explana-
tion for this result is that of a brand awareness exter-
nality (e.g., Blair and Lafontaine 2002). Given the large
number of units of the two company-owned brands
already in existence in 1990, however, it is unlikely
that these brands beneﬁted from additional customer
awareness when new units were added. The brand
awareness externality is also not a likely explana-
tion because the incumbent units of large franchised
brands such as Holiday Inn and Best Western, similar
in initial size to La Quinta and Motel 6 at the begin-
ning of the study period, appeared to enjoy no such
externality.
Regardless of whether it is a correlation or a causal
result, the ﬁnding for company-owned brands serves
as an important contrast to the negative revenue
effects found for the franchised brands. The company-
owned ﬁrms are likely restricting their additional
units to those locations where the proﬁts will out-
weigh losses at their nearby units. Markets with
growing demand are likely to fulﬁll this condition.
The franchisors appear to be acting consistently with
incentives to approve units anywhere where fran-
chisees are willing to build them.
6.2. Implications for Research on Governance
Form and Exclusive Territories
The results of this paper inform theory regarding the
effect of governance form on strategic choices such
as market entry and on likelihood of channel con-
ﬂict. The ﬁndings here suggest pros and cons of each
of the two governance forms for the upstream fran-
chisor. The franchisors in this study were able to
add units at a faster rate than were the company-
owned ﬁrms, suggesting that the strategic toughness
enabled by franchising (Baye et al. 1996) and the
incentive misalignment due to the royalty structure
(Kaufmann and Rangan 1990) do allow franchisors to
gain higher market share relative to company-owned
ﬁrms. However, the results also showed that franchis-
ing generates the channel conﬂict of encroachment.
Not only is the channel conﬂict costly for franchisors
in terms of lobbying against anti-encroachment leg-
islation and defending their contracts in courts, but
the underlying misalignment of goals might also
lead to greater opportunism (Anderson 1988). Fran-
chisees commonly exhibit opportunism by “free-
riding” on the brand’s reputation by undersupplying
quality (Brickley 1999); disgruntled franchisees suf-
fering encroachment may be more likely to engage
in such behavior. The goal misalignments between
franchisees and franchisors, and among franchisees,
may also inhibit cooperation (e.g., Jap 1999). For
example, Darr et al. (1995) found that within a fran-
chised chain, knowledge transferred effectively from
unit to unit only if the same franchisee owned both
units; no direct knowledge transfer occurred between
proximate same-brand units of different franchisees.
While not suggested by those authors, encroachment-
induced frictions between franchisees likely play a
substantial role in this lack of cooperation.
This paper also contributes to our understanding of
upstream ﬁrms’ use of exclusive territories. The paper
discussed two incentives for franchisors to eschew
exclusivity—strategic toughness and greater royalties.
Interestingly, other theoretical models suggest that
assigning and enforcing exclusive territories is ben-
eﬁcial for upstream ﬁrms such as franchisors (e.g.,
Dutta et al. 1994). Similar models emphasize the com-
bination of vertical separation and exclusive territo-
ries as a means of keeping downstream prices higher
than a vertically integrated (company-owned) ﬁrm
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could sustain in the face of competition (e.g., Rey and
Stiglitz 1995).
The negative encroachment effects found in this
paper, combined with the franchisors’ stated reluc-
tance to use territories, imply that franchisors pre-
fer the strategic toughness and higher sales royalty
receipts associated with encroachment to the possible
higher downstream prices associated with exclusive
territories. One explanation is that the sales royalty
makes higher downstream prices more unappealing
for franchisors than for other types of upstream ﬁrms,
because sales levels will shrink as the prices increase.
Another possibility stems from the empirical regu-
larity that the franchisors very rarely customize con-
tract terms for individual franchisees (Lafontaine and
Shaw 1999). They might not be able to increase the
sales royalty rates—and thus capture some of the ben-
eﬁt of the high downstream prices occurring within
exclusive territories—to offset the lower sales levels
also caused by the higher prices.
6.3. Implications for Policy and Practitioners
As an increasing number of franchisors ﬁnd they have
exhausted the supply of new domestic markets, they
will continue to grow by adding units in markets
they already serve. Ongoing channel conﬂicts with
franchisees are inevitable, and franchisees will prob-
ably continue to seek legislative and judicial protec-
tion against encroachment. However, encroachment
does not necessarily signal a need for govern-
ment intervention. On one hand, the results regard-
ing reduced revenues found here, combined with
Conlin’s (2003) ﬁnding that prices are lower in
areas where more units are franchised, suggest that
encroachment enhances societal welfare. In addition,
the fast growth of the franchised brands has provided
consumers with convenience in the form of many
locations to choose from. On the other hand, the reg-
ularity that franchised hotels appear more likely to
be shut down than company-owned hotels (12% vs.
4.5% in the 1990s) suggests a detriment to welfare.
The difference in failure rates is not consistent with
other work, however. Kalnins and Mayer (2004) con-
ducted a hazard rate analysis of pizza restaurant fail-
ure and found no difference in failure rates between
franchised and company-owned stores.
From the point of view of franchisee welfare,
the contracts franchisees signed with seven of the
eight franchisors in this study provided no protec-
tion from encroachment. If exclusive territories are
particularly important to franchisees, the market is
able to ﬁll this need. Many franchisors, typically
those with less established brands, are very will-
ing to provide franchisees with exclusive territories
(Azoulay and Shane 2001). Even after new same-
brand units have encroached on an incumbent’s mar-
ket, the expected value of remaining a franchisee of
the brand probably remains positive. Previous work
(Kaufmann and Lafontaine 1994, Michael and Moore
1995) has found that franchisors leave substantial
rents with franchisees. Encroachment surely reduces
these rents, but further operations probably remain
viable. Otherwise, it is unlikely that franchisors could
consistently recruit new franchisees for their brands.
The results presented here do strongly suggest,
however, that franchisees should be skeptical of
the claims some franchisors have made to justify
encroachment (see, e.g., Sheridan and Gillespie 1995).
Franchisors have stated that loss of revenues at exist-
ing locations is an unfortunate but unavoidable aspect
of expansion. However, the lack of an encroachment
effect within expanding company-owned brands
implies that encroachment is not merely an unavoid-
able aspect of growth. Franchisors have also made
the argument that if they do not open a unit at a
promising location, then one of the other franchisors
will. Implicitly evoking the idea of a brand external-
ity, they add that having one of their units will be less
disadvantageous to an existing franchisee than a unit
of a competitor’s brand. The results here also con-
tradict this assertion. Brand conversions and new
units of the same brand reduce an incumbent’s rev-
enues far more than the entry of other brands of
the same quality tier. Finally, potential franchisees
should be aware that the “encroachment policies”
touted by franchisors have not eliminated the effects
of encroachment.
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